Aerospace Knowledge and Technology Journal

Aerospace Knowledge and Technology Journal

Spoofing attack detection in integrated GNSS/INS navigation systems using marginalized likelihood ratio test

Document Type : Research Paper

Authors
Mohsen Shadmehri 1
Reza Mahboobi Esfanjani 2
1 Ph.D. Student, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Sahand University of Technology, Tabriz, Iran.
2 Professor, Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, Sahand University of Technology, Tabriz, Iran.
Abstract
In integrated inertial-satellite navigation (GNSS/INS), complementary characteristics of Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) and Inertial Navigation System (INS) are combined with together to enhance navigation performance. However, a malicious attacker can spoof satellite navigation data to induce a false position into the victim's navigation system. In this paper, for the case that counterfeit signals bypass signal-based attack detectors employed in the GNSS receiver, a novel spoofing attack detector for loosely coupled GNSS/INS systems is developed using the Marginalized Likelihood Ratio Test (MLRT), in which, instead of estimating nuisance random parameters, they are eliminated through marginalization. Compared to existing approaches, using MLRT removes the need for manually setting a detection threshold and also improves robustness against system model uncertainties. Simulation results in MATLAB demonstrate that, under a challenging attack scenario where the spoofed path gradually diverges from the true one, the proposed approach achieves a shorter detection delay, up to fifty percent compared to rival methods.
Keywords
integrated GNSS/INS navigation
spoofing
attack detector
marginalized likelihood ratio.
Subjects
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Aerospace Knowledge and Technology Journal
Volume 14, Issue 2 - Serial Number 2
October 2025
Pages 131-142